Companies' earnings conference calls are perceived to be venues for sell-side equity analysts to ask management questions. In this study, we examine another important conference call participant-the buy-side analyst-that has been underexplored in the literature due to data limitations. Using a large sample of transcripts, we identify 4,045 buy-side analysts from 724 institutional investment firms that participated (i.e., asked a question) on 13,373 conference calls to examine the determinants and implications of their participation. Buy-side analysts are more likely to participate when sell-side analyst coverage is low, dispersion in earnings forecasts is high, and when the hosting company reported bad news, consistent with buy-side analysts directly acquiring information when a company's information environment is poor. Institutional investors trade more of a company's stock after their buy-side analysts participate on the call, suggesting buy-side analysts update their stock recommendations after a call and their employers act on the updated research. Finally, we find evidence that the buy-side analysts we observe on the calls and the subsequent trading decisions by their employing institutions are reflective of other buy-side analysts and institutions we do not observe, resulting in company-level changes in stock prices, trading volume, institutional ownership, and short interest.
Introduction
The role of sell-side equity analysts in the capital markets has been extensively researched by academics over the past several decades (Bradshaw 2011) . In contrast, due to data limitations, there has been very little research on buy-side analysts. Buy-side analysts work for institutional investment firms and have different incentives and responsibilities compared to their sell-side counterparts working at brokerage firms (Groysberg, Healy, and Chapman, 2008) , which makes buy-side analysts not only worthy of study in their own right, but also makes the inferences and conclusions from the sell-side analyst literature not generalizable to buy-side analysts. While it is widely assumed that buy-side analysts conduct fundamental research and make stock recommendations to their firms' portfolio managers, little is known about how they gather and process information because their research activities are not generally observable. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on buy-side analysts by 1) identifying 4,045 buy-side analysts from 724 institutional investment firms that participated (i.e., asked a question) in 13,373 earnings conference calls, 2) examining the economic determinants of their participation, 3) investigating the role of their participation in their investment firms' trading of the companies' stock, and 4) exploring the implications for future stock returns, trading volume, total institutional ownership, and short interest of the company hosting the conference call. 1 The few published papers on buy-side analysts have focused on the outputs of their research: earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Groysberg, Healy, and Chapman 2008; Groysberg, Healy, Serafeim, and Shanthikumar 2013; Cheng, Liu, and Qian 2006; Rebello and Wei 2014; Frey and Herbst 2014) . Typically using proprietary data from a single institutional investment firm, these papers conclude that research generated by buy-side analysts has value and is associated with positive abnormal returns for the funds that use it. In contrast to studies that focus on the outputs of buy-side research, Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2014) survey 344 buy-side analysts from 181 investment firms and conduct follow-up interviews with 16 analysts to gain insights about the inputs and incentives that shape buy-side research. They find that recent 10-K/Qs are more useful than quarterly conference calls, management guidance, and recent earnings performance in determining buy-side analysts' stock recommendations. 2 We examine participation in companies' earnings conference calls to shed light on its importance as one of the research activities performed by buy-side analysts and to answer several unexplored research questions. In particular, we are interested in understanding the prevalence of buy-side analysts in companies' earnings conference calls and the reasons they participate in the calls. We test predictions about whether buy-side analyst participation is related to a company's information environment, subsequent trading in the company's stock by the employing institution, and company-level price discovery.
First, using a sample of 56,285 conference call transcripts from the second quarter of 2002 through the first quarter of 2009, we identify 4,045 buy-side analysts from 724 institutional investment firms who asked at least one question on 13,373 earnings conference calls. Our sample includes some of the largest investment firms in the U.S. (e.g., Barclays, Fidelity, Wellington, and T. Rowe Price) and even several of the buy-side analysts named in Institutional Investor magazine's annual "Best of the Buy-Side" rankings, as voted by hundreds of sell-side 2 They argue that buy-side analysts do not value participating in companies' earnings conference calls because they believe their private information (e.g., ideas, thoughts, opinions, etc.) will be publicly revealed. While this proprietary cost explanation makes sense for some buy-side analysts, it is likely not a belief shared by all buy-side analysts since we observe thousands of them in our sample of conference call transcripts. There are likely other explanations for why buy-side analysts do or do not participate in conference calls. We view our study as complementary to Brown et al. (2014) in trying to better understand the process in which buy-side analysts gather information.
analysts each year. 3 The participation by these highly-ranked buy-side analysts suggests that asking a question on a conference call is an important aspect of their research and due diligence.
Buy-side analysts ask questions in 24% of all earnings conference calls, over 3,000 conference calls have two or more buy-side analysts asking questions, and buy-side analysts represent 5% of all questioners. Thus, while the vast majority of conference call participants are sell-side equity analysts, participation by buy-side analysts in earnings conference calls is not rare.
Secondly, we examine why these buy-side analysts participate in conference calls despite the common perception that they are venues for sell-side analysts and company managers to interact. Unlike sell-side analysts, who act as information intermediaries gathering and disseminating information about companies, buy-side analysts are typically private in their information gathering activities, so their observable participation in conference calls makes for a unique research setting that has been previously unexplored. We posit that buy-side analysts take a more active role in acquiring information (i.e., asking questions) when the company's information environment is poor and its future performance is uncertain. Consistent with this prediction, we find that buy-side analysts are more likely to participate when a company has lower sell-side analyst coverage, when there is greater uncertainty in earnings forecasts made by sell-side analysts, and where a company misses consensus earnings forecast. Companies with buy-side analysts in the conference call also tend to be older, have higher book-to-market ratios, and experience more negative earnings surprises.
In our next analysis, we investigate whether conference call participation by buy-side analysts is indicative of their investment firms' trading of the shares of the company hosting the 3 There were 35 buy-side analysts from 17 investment firms voted as the "Best of the Buy-Side" between 2003 and 2008. We find that eight of these analysts are in our sample of earnings conference call transcripts. One of them is described as having little time to waste because he covers 55 companies; the time and effort he allocates to listen and participate in a company's earnings conference call suggests that conference call participation is not a trivial task (Martin 2005). conference call. Using pre-and post-conference call ownership data, we examine changes in quarterly institutional ownership to better understand whether investment firms tend to change their shareholdings after their buy-side analysts participate in the conference calls. We use a difference-in-differences approach with a control sample of institutions that did not have buyside analysts participating in a conference call to examine if conference call participation leads to a greater degree of trading after the call. This design allows us to examine differences in ownership changes between the same set of institutions and companies across quarters in which the key difference was participation in the conference call.
We find that of the nearly 18,000 instances in which a buy-side analyst asks a question on a conference call, 55% of the time the institution employing the buy-side analyst does not own the company's stock as of the prior calendar quarter (i.e., a "non-owning institution") and the remaining 45% of participating buy-side analysts are from owning institutions. In either case, we find that institutions with participating analysts on the conference call are more likely to change their ownership compared to the control group of institutions without buy-side analyst participation. In addition, institutions with buy-side analyst participation increased or decreased their shareholdings to a greater degree compared to the control group. These results hold in both univariate tests and in regressions in which we control for other factors that may be associated with changes in institutional ownership. Overall, we interpret our results as suggesting that institutions and their buy-side analysts view conference calls as a low-cost method to collect new information to update their research and that buy-side analysts' participation is indicative of institutions' subsequent trading in the company's stock.
In our final set of analyses, we test whether buy-side analyst participation is associated with future changes in stock prices, trading volume, total institutional ownership, and short interest of the company hosting the conference call. We predict that the buy-side analysts we observe in conference calls, and the employing institutions they represent, are reflective of other buy-side analysts and institutions that we do not observe. Our premise is that the investment decisions of similar institutions should be driven by the same underlying economic factors. If this is the case, then we should find that buy-side analyst participation is not only associated with institution-level changes in ownership, but also company-level changes in stock prices, trading volume, total institutional ownership, and short interest. Our results support this hypothesis, as the number of buy-side analysts participating on the conference call is positively associated with future absolute returns, absolute changes in share turnover, absolute changes in institutional ownership, and absolute changes in short interest. Overall, this set of results provides support for our prediction that the buy-side analysts we observe in conference calls and the subsequent trading decisions by their employing institutions are reflective of other buy-side analysts and institutions that we do not observe.
This study contributes to the literature by examining the role of buy-side analysts in the capital markets. While a handful of prior papers have examined the research outputs of buy-side analysts, little to no work has focused on the inputs of buy-side research. 4 Using a broad sample of transcripts of earnings conference calls, we highlight that: 1) participation by buy-side analysts is not uncommon; 2) buy-side analysts are more likely to participate when the company's information environment is poor and when it misses consensus earnings forecasts; 3) buy-side analyst participation is indicative of subsequent trading by their investment firms, suggesting that the finding of Rebello and Wei (2014) and Frey and Herbst (2014) that buy-side analyst recommendations influence the investment firm's trading decisions is generalizable to a large sample of investment firms; and 4) the actions we observe for buy-side analysts on conference calls are associated with the hosting company's subsequent absolute stock return, trading volume, total institutional ownership, and short interest.
This paper continues as follows. The next section reviews the literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variable construction. Section 4 presents the empirical findings. We discuss sensitivity and robustness checks in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Institutional Background, Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Institutional Background
A buy-side analyst works for an institutional investment firm, which explains the "buy- (Knox and Kenny, 2003; Brown et al. 2014 ).
This fact suggests that the research activities buy-side analysts conduct prior to recommending that a portfolio manager buy or sell a particular stock are of utmost importance to the analysts. In this study, we examine participation in earnings conference calls to better understand its importance to buy-side analysts as a research activity and information source.
Literature Review
Despite the rise in institutional ownership in U.S. equities over the last several decades (Gompers and Metrick, 2001) , there is very little research on the buy-side analysts who influence the investment decisions of portfolio and asset managers. This lack of research is due to a lack of data on the activities of buy-side analysts and the inputs and outputs of their research. As a result, the few studies that have been published are based on proprietary data usually obtained from one investment firm.
Most of the prior studies have focused primarily on the outputs of buy-side research:
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Using proprietary data from one buy-side firm, Groysberg, Healy and Chapman (2008) (Rebello and Wei, 2014; Frey and Herbst, 2014) . Once again, the generalizability of these studies is limited, as they are based on data from a single buy-side firm or survey data.
In contrast to studies that focus on the outputs of buy-side research, Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2014) survey 344 buy-side analysts from 181 investment firms and conduct follow-up interviews with 16 analysts to gain insights about the inputs and incentives that shape buy-side research. They highlight that buy-side analysts view 10-K and 10-Q filings to be more useful than other forms of disclosure in producing their stock recommendations. Specifically referring to earnings conference calls, statements from a few interviewees suggested that buyside analysts do not participate (i.e., ask questions) on conference calls to avoid revealing their private information (e.g., ideas, thoughts, opinions, etc.) to the public. While we expect some buy-side analysts take this position and never participate in earnings conference calls, our sample of conference call transcripts includes nearly 18,000 instances in which a buy-side analyst asked a question. As a result, we believe that examining the reasons why some buy-side analysts participate in earnings conference calls and how that participation is associated with future institutional investment decisions advances our understanding of the role that buy-side analysts play in the capital markets.
Hypothesis Development
Earnings conference calls are typically considered venues for sell-side analysts and company managers to interact. As a result, there is a large literature that examines conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium and a source of information for sell-side analysts (Tasker 1998; Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner 2001; Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto 2002; Miller 2003, 2004) . However, our data show that buy-side analysts also participate in the question and answer portion of conference calls, which suggests that the call is also a source of information for buy-side analysts. Given that Brown et al. (2014) show, using survey and interview data, that some buy-side analysts are not inclined to participate because of the public nature of the conference call, we posit that buy-side analysts are more inclined to ask questions under certain conditions.
When a company's information environment is poor, typically characterized by little to no coverage by sell-side analysts, we expect more buy-side analysts must gather their own information. Conversely, when there is a high level of coverage by sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts can rely on their sell-side counterparts for industry knowledge, access to management, and company-specific information. We also expect that even if a company has sell-side coverage, greater uncertainty about firm fundamentals can be a reason for buy-side analysts to ask questions in a conference call. These predictions are supported by the model in Cheng, Liu, and Qian (2006) , which shows that institutional fund managers rely more on buy-side research when the quality of sell-side research decreases and the uncertainty in sell-side earnings forecasts increases. For these reasons, our first prediction is as follows:
Prediction 1: Buy-side analysts are more likely to participate in a company's earnings conference call when the company's information environment is poor.
Using proprietary data from one institutional investment firm, Rebello and Wei (2014) and Frey and Herbst (2014) find that buy-side analyst recommendations influence the investment firm's trading decisions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that buy-side analysts cover approximately 40 companies, but keep an additional 40 companies on their "radar" (Retkwa 2009; Abramowitz 2006 ). When they become interested in one of the companies on their radar, they focus their attention to conduct more due diligence on that company. If participation in a company's earnings conference call is part of a buy-side analyst's due diligence process in forming or updating his or her stock recommendations, then it follows that conference call participation will be a precursor to trading by the buy-side analyst's investment firm. Specifically, for those institutions that own the company's stock as of the calendar quarter prior to the conference call (i.e., owning institutions), we predict they are more likely to increase or decrease their shareholdings by the next calendar quarter and by greater amounts compared to a control group of owning institutions without buy-side participation on the conference call. For those institutions that do not own the company's stock prior to the conference call (i.e., non-owning institutions), we predict that they are more likely to establish shareholdings by the next calendar quarter and by greater amounts compared to a control group of non-owning institutions without buy-side participation. Thus, our second prediction is as follows:
Prediction 2: Institutional investment firms trade more of a company's stock after their buy-side analysts participate in the company's conference call, relative to institutional investment firms without buy-side analyst participation.
Given prediction 2 that institutional investment firms trade more of a company's stock after their buy-side analysts participate in the company's conference call, we next examine whether these trades are reflective of the actions of other institutional investors. We conjecture that the economic factors that motivate the institutions we observe to trade the stock also motivate other institutions to make similar trades even though they do not have buy-side analysts participating on the conference call. Therefore, the trading decisions of the institutional investment firms with participating buy-side analysts on the conference call may serve as a proxy for the trading decisions of other institutional investors not participating on the call. 5 Under this conjecture, we will observe changes in ownership not only at the institution level, but also at the company level.
For example, if we observe one non-owning institution with a buy-side analyst on the conference call establish an initial ownership position in the company's stock, and this trading decision is in fact reflective of the trading decisions of other non-owning institutions, then we will observe an increase in total institutional ownership after the conference call. Similarly, if we observe one owning institution (with a buy-side analyst on the call) sell the stock after a conference call and other owning institutions do the same, then we will observe a decrease in total institutional ownership. Finally, if we observe a non-owning institution not establish an initial ownership position after the conference call, then that institution may be increasing or decreasing a short position in the stock, which may proxy for the actions of other non-owning institutions. In any of these scenarios, we will also observe an increase in absolute stock return and trading volume. Thus, our final prediction is as follows.
Prediction 3:
Participation by buy-side analysts on a company's earnings conference call is positively associated with future absolute stock return, trading volume, and changes in total institutional ownership and short interest.
Sample data
Our data is comprised of companies with available conference call transcripts from the The transcripts contain the name and affiliation of anyone who asked a question during the question and answer (Q&A) portion of the call. There are a total of 381,951 questioners in our sample, roughly seven per conference call. To identify buy-side analysts, we first search all affiliations for words that are common in the names of institutional investment firms including "capital," "asset," "fund," "investment," "management," "advisor," "partner," and "investor."
Second, we exclude all affiliations that are known to be sell-side brokerage firms and investment banks based on data from I/B/E/S and our own internet searches of sell-side firms. Third, with the list of affiliations obtained from the first step and the remaining affiliations after the second step, we manually match the affiliations to institutional investors in the Thomson Reuters database of 13F filings. 7 Through this procedure, we identify 17,691 questioners, or 4.6% of the total, as working for institutional investment firms. 8 To estimate the number of unique buy-side analysts, we compute the number of unique caller names from each investment firm, while allowing for some variation and misspellings of names. 9 We estimate there are 4,045 unique buyside analysts from 724 institutional investment firms in our sample. 10 The top 45 institutional investment firms ranked by total number of conference calls, along with their number of buyside analysts, is shown in Appendix 1.
We find that 24% of the earnings conference calls in our sample, or 13,373 calls, have at least one buy-side analyst who asked a question. In addition to conference call data, we require other data sources for our empirical tests.
We use I/B/E/S data to compute sell-side analyst coverage and earnings forecast variables, Thomson Reuters 13F filings data to compute companies' quarterly institutional ownership, 8 Without the requirement of matching buy-side affiliations to the Thomson Reuters 13F filings database, we actually identity 22,800 buy-side analysts, or 5.9% of the total number of questioners. 9 Specifically, we compute the number of unique names per investment firm using only the first four letters of the analyst's name. For example, "Stephan Smith" would be considered the same person as "Stephen Smith" because the first four letters of each name is "
Step." However, it is still possible for common names to vary in spelling within the first four letters, such as "John" and "Jon." For such cases, our estimate of the number of unique buy-side analysts in our sample would be overstated. 10 In untabulated analyses, we estimate the average portfolio value for each of the 724 institutional investment firms during our sample period and find that most of them fall into the 3 rd or 4 th quartile (4 th being the highest) in terms of total portfolio size among all institutional investment firms in the Thomson Reuters 13F database.
Compustat data to compute companies' quarterly financial variables and monthly short interest, and CRSP data to compute stock returns and trading volume. All variable definitions are shown in Appendix 2.
Empirical Analysis
Determinants of Buy-Side Analyst Participation on Conference Calls
To test our first prediction, we run an ordered logistic regression with three ordinal levels on the dependent variable NUMBUYSIDERS (Green, 1990; Allison 1999) . The first level is zero buy-side analysts on the conference call, the second level is one buy-side analyst, and the third level is two or more buy-side analysts on the call (i.e., NUMBUYSIDERS=0, 1, or 2+).
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Our regression equation is as follows:
Our first prediction is that buy-side analysts are more likely to participate on a company's earnings conference call when the company's information environment is poor. We use the level of sell-side analyst coverage and forecast dispersion to proxy for a company's information environment. For each company i and quarter t, we measure the level of sell-side analyst coverage with the variable NUMSSANALYST, defined as the number of unique sell-side analysts in the I/B/E/S detailed earnings per share (EPS) database that provided any type of EPS forecast for the company from the prior conference call date to one day before the current conference call date. For companies with no EPS forecasts in a given quarter, we set NUMSSANALYST to zero. We measure sell-side analyst forecast dispersion, DISPERSION, as 11 We also run OLS regressions in which the dependent variable ranges from zero to seven buy-side analysts in the conference call. The inferences from the OLS regressions are very similar to those from the ordered logistic regressions. For brevity, the results of the OLS regressions are not tabulated but are available upon request.
the standard deviation of analysts' current quarter EPS forecast measured over the same period as NUMSSANALYST. For companies with no EPS forecasts or one forecast from a single sellside analyst, we cannot compute a standard deviation. Therefore, to avoid losing observations of companies with coverage from zero or one sell-side analyst, we set DISPERSION equal to the mean value for the sample. 12 Our predictions are that the estimated coefficients for NUMSSANALYST and DISPERSION are negative and positive, respectively (β 1 <0 and β 2 >0).
We include several variables to control for other factors that may be associated with interest in the company in general and interest in the earnings conference calls in particular. We control for total institutional ownership with the log of the number of institutional investors in the company (NUMINSTINV), as the more institutional investors a company has, the more likely it is that an institutional investor will participate on the conference call. We control for company size using the log of market value of equity (COMPANYSIZE), company age using the log number of months that the company has been listed in CRSP (COMPANYAGE), the company's book-to-market ratio (book value of equity divided by market value of equity), two indicator variables for whether the company had a positive or negative earnings surprise (POSEPSSURPRISE and NEGEPSSURPRISE), and the company's stock return over the 90-day period prior to the conference call (RETPRIOR90DAYS). To control for a time-of-day effect, in which there is possibly more interest in the conference call if it occurs before or during trading hours, we include an indicator variable (INTRADAY) for whether the start of the call occurs between 6:00am and 3:45pm Eastern Time. Lastly, we include the absolute value of future three-month returns (ABSRET) to proxy for potential mispricing in the company's stock at the time of the conference call that would attract buy-side interest in the company. All variable definitions are shown in Appendix 2.
We repeat our regressions using variants of our dependent variable, again coded for three ordinal levels (0, 1, or 2+), to shed additional light on the determinants of buy-side participation of various types. In addition to the number of buy-side analysts (NUMBUYSIDERS), we use the number of buy-side analysts from owning institutions (NUMBUYSIDERS_OWN) and nonowning institutions (NUMBUYSIDERS_NOTOWN) to examine whether prior ownership matters in determining buy-side participation.
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in our determinants test are shown in Table 2 Panel B shows mean and median values, along with tests for differences, of the variables for companies partitioned by whether buy-side analysts participated on their conference calls.
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The mean (median) number of sell-side analysts covering companies with buy-side analyst participation is 6.3 (5.0), which is lower than 8.0 (6.0) for companies without buy-side participation. The mean (median) forecast dispersion for companies with buy-side analysts is 0.044 (0.033), which is higher than 0.038 (0.024) for companies without buy-side participation.
Differences in values in the control variables indicate that companies with buy-side analyst 13 To ease presentation of univariate differences, we form two groups only (0 and 1 or more buy-side analysts on a call). In the subsequent ordered logistic regression, we form three levels of the dependent variable (0, 1, and 2 or more).
participation tend to be smaller in market capitalization, are older, have higher book-to-market ratios, have higher prior returns, and have fewer positive and more negative earnings surprises.
All differences in the mean and median values for each group are significant at the 1% level, except for absolute future three-month returns (ABSRET). These univariate results support Prediction 1 and are consistent with buy-side analysts participating on earnings conference calls of companies with lower sell-side analyst coverage and higher earnings forecast dispersionproxies for a poor information environment.
We next test our prediction in a multivariate setting. The results of estimating regression equation (1) are presented in Table 2 , Panel C, Columns (1) that buy-side analysts tend to participate on the calls of older, more value-oriented companies, when earnings news is negative, and when the call occurs before or during market trading hours.
The positive coefficient for COMPANYSIZE differs from the univariate results and indicates that after controlling for the other factors, more buy-side analysts tend to participate on the conference calls of larger companies. Lastly, the positive coefficient for NUMINSTINV in Column (2) indicates that more buy-side analysts from owning institutions tend to be on the call when a company has more institutional investors, while the negative coefficient for the same variable in Column (3) indicates that fewer analysts from non-owning institutions tend to be on the call when a company has more institutional investors. 
Institutional Trading Subsequent to Buy-Side Analyst Participation on Conference Calls
In this section we examine whether the institutional investment firms with buy-side analysts on companies' conference calls subsequently trade (and by what amounts) the stock of the company hosting the conference call. The purpose of this analysis is to better understand whether buy-side analyst participation is a precursor to institutional trading in the company's stock and to investigate whether the results documented in Rebello and Wei (2014) and Frey and Herbst (2014) can be generalized from one investment firm to a larger sample of investment firms. Our second prediction is that participation of buy-side analysts on a company's earnings conference call is associated with greater changes in ownership by the institutional investment firm employing the analysts than if there were no participation.
We use a difference-in-differences approach with a control sample of owning and nonowning institutions that did not have buy-side analysts on a conference call to examine if conference call participation leads to a greater degree of trading. Using data from the Thomson Reuters 13F filings database, we compute the percentage ownership that each institution has for each company in our sample, measured at the calendar quarters ended before and after the conference call, to compute changes in quarterly ownership. We note that ownership and changes in ownership can be zero as well as non-zero for any company-institution pair in any given quarter. With a sample of 56,285 conference calls (involving 3,414 companies) and 724 institutional investment firms, there is a total of 40,750,340 (56,285*724) possible companyinstitution-quarters for our analyses. 15 However, we eliminate about 30% of these observations in 15 Another approach is to expand the number of control observations to include all institutions in the Thomson Reuters 13F database (not just the ones we observe in transcripts) during our sample period. There are 4,003 such which an institution did not appear to exist (i.e., not in the 13F database) at the time of a company's conference call, which leaves approximately 28 million observations in which any of the institutions in our sample could have plausibly owned or not owned the company hosting the conference call. Table 3 , Panel A presents summary statistics on the percentage of owning and nonowning institutions with and without buy-side analysts on a conference call that subsequently increased, decreased, or did not change their level of ownership in the company. In addition, the mean and median of the changes are presented for both the institutions with and without buy-side analyst participation and tests for differences. Of the 7,890 buy-side analysts from owning institutions that participated on a conference call, 45% of the institutions increased their ownership, 49% decreased their ownership, and 6% did not change their ownership after the call.
Of the owning institutions without buy-side analyst participation, 41% increased their ownership, 50% decreased their ownership, and 9% did not change their ownership. Thus, the comparison of owning institutions suggests that there are slightly more changes in ownership (94% vs. 91%) among institutions with buy-side analysts on the conference call. Of the 9,801 buy-side analysts from non-owning institutions that participated on a conference call, 8% of the institutions established initial ownership in the company. By comparison, only 1% of non-owning institutions without buy-side analyst participation established initial ownership in the company.
Focusing on institutions that increased ownership, we find that owning institutions with buy-side analysts on the call had a mean and median increase of 0.5%, compared to a mean (median) increase of 0.2% (0.1%) for owning institutions without buy-side analysts on the call.
The difference in differences is significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed t-test for means and institutions, which would result in 225,308,855 (56,285*4,003) possible company-institution-quarters for our analyses. Results are similar as those presented in Table 3 when using this expanded control set.
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians. Non-owning institutions with buy-side analysts on the call had a mean (median) ownership of 1.2% (0.4%) after the call, compared to a mean (median) ownership of 0.3% (0.1%) for non-owning institutions without buy-side analysts on the call. The difference in differences is significant at the 1% level for both the mean and median. Regarding decreases in percentage ownership among owning institutions, we find that owning institutions with buy-side analysts on the call had a mean and median decrease of 0.7%, compared to a mean (median) decrease of 0.2% (0.1%) for owning institutions without buy-side analysts on the call.
The difference in differences is again significant at the 1% level for the mean and median.
The results in Panel A indicate that when a buy-side analyst participates on a company's earnings conference call, the analyst's investment firm will alter its ownership of the company's stock by a greater degree than when its buy-side analyst does not participate on the call. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the buy-side analysts using conference calls as an avenue to acquire information to update their recommendations and to identify new investment opportunities, which often leads to subsequent trading in the company's stock.
We next test Prediction 2 in a multivariate setting. We regress the absolute change in percentage ownership that institution j has in company i in quarter t (ABSCHGOWNERSHIP i,j,t )
on an indicator variable (PARTICIPATEINCALL i,j,t ) for whether a buy-side analyst employed by institution j participated on company i's conference call in quarter t.
If conference call participation leads to greater changes in ownership, then the coefficient for PARTICIPATEINCALL will be significantly positive (β 1 >0).
We also control for several institution-and company-specific factors that may be associated with institutions' quarterly changes in ownership in companies. In particular, changes in ownership may be related to the size of an institution's shareholding in a given company and the size of the institution's total portfolio. Accordingly, we include the variable VALUEOFOWNERSHIP, defined as the log of the dollar value of ownership that institution j has in company i, and INVFIRMSIZE, defined as the log of total dollar value of all the investment firm's shareholdings. We also include NUMFIRMSINPORT as the log of the total number of companies in an institution's portfolio to capture the amount of attention (or lack of) that a company may receive from the portfolio manager. Finally, we include a company's absolute stock return from the prior 90 calendar days (ABSRETPRIOR90DAYS). 16 All control variables are measured as of the calendar quarter before the conference call and are shown in Appendix 2.
The results of estimating regression equation (2) are presented in Table 3 , Panel B.
Standard errors are clustered by institutional investment firm and year fixed effects are included.
The estimated coefficient for PARTICIPATEINCALL is significantly positive, indicating that when buy-side analysts participate on a company's conference call, the analyst's institution tends to increase or decrease its ownership in the company by a greater amount. This result is consistent with Prediction 2 and with the univariate results in Panel A. Among the control variables, we find that there is also a greater absolute change in ownership when the value of shareholdings is greater, when the institutional investment firm is larger, and when absolute prior returns are greater. When there is a greater number of companies in an institution's portfolio, there tend to be smaller changes in ownership. But to alleviate that potential concern, we compute ABSCPIO i,t excluding the institutions with buy-side analysts on company i's conference call in quarter t to capture changes in ownership by institutions without buy-side analysts on the call.
Conference Call Participation and
We include control variables that may be associated with future absolute stock returns, absolute changes in share turnover, absolute changes in total institutional ownership, and absolute changes in short interest. ABSEPSSURPRISE is defined as the absolute value of actual reported EPS minus the most recent sell-side analyst mean consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement. We also include company size and the book-to-market ratio as previously defined. To control for stock return momentum, we use RETPRIOR11MO as the stock return for the 11-month period starting one year prior to the conference call data and ending one month prior to the conference call date. We control for increases and decreases in sell-side analyst interest in a conference call using NC_ANALYSTS and COV_ANALYSTS_ABSENT, as defined in Jung, Wong, and Zhang (2015) . Specifically, NC_ANALYSTS is the number of non-covering sell-side analysts on the conference call and COV_ANALYSTS_ABSENT is the number of covering sell-side analysts who are absent from the current conference call (but participated on the prior conference call), both scaled by the number of sell-side analysts on the conference call. 17 To control for other possible omitted factors that may be associated with each of our dependent variables, we include a lagged version (measured for the prior quarter) of the dependent variable (ABSRET_LAG, ABSCTURNOVER_LAG, ABSCPIO_LAG and ABSCSHORTINT_LAG). Descriptive statistics of the variables used in these regressions are shown in Table 4 , Panel A.
For the final control variable, we include the inverse mills ratio (IMR) to control for potential sample selection bias related to buy-side analysts' decision to participate on certain companies' earnings conference calls but not others. That is, since we do not observe when buyside analysts do not participate in a call (but are perhaps listening), our dependent variable for whether there are any buy-side analysts on a conference call is zero for a significant fraction of the observations. The results of our univariate and multivariate determinants tests presented in Table 2 indicate that buy-side analysts tend to participate on the conference calls of companies with poorer information environments and companies that are older, have higher book-to-market ratios, and have negative earnings news. As a result, regressions of future absolute stock returns, absolute changes in share turnover, absolute changes in institutional ownership, and absolute changes in short interest without correcting for the potential selection bias may lead to biased coefficient estimates (Heckman 1979) . To compute the inverse mills ratio, we first model the decision for a buy-side analyst to participate on a company's conference call using a probit 17 As in Jung et al. (2015) , the computation of COV_ANALYSTS_ABSENT requires one lag quarter of data to determine if the absent sell-side analysts were on the prior conference call. Thus, for the regressions presented in Table 4 in which COV_ANALYSTS_ABSENT is included, the sample period is from the third quarter of 2002 to the first quarter of 2009. regression similar to equation (1) except that the dependent variable is binary (1 for any buy-side analysts on the call and 0 for none). 18 We then include the IMR from the probit regression into regression equation (3) as a control variable.
The first set of results from estimating regression equation (3) are presented in Table 4 , 
Sensitivity and Robustness Tests
Alternative specifications of variables of interest
18 For brevity, the results of this first-stage probit regression are not tabulated, but they are available upon request. 19 The estimated coefficients on IMR are statistically significant in all three sets of regressions reported in Panels B and C of Table 4 . While the IMR variable is included to correct for self-selection in the estimation of equation (3), it can also be interpreted as an estimate of the private information underlying the decision of a buy-side analyst to participate on a conference call or not (see Li and Prabhala (2007) for a detailed explanation).
One of the explanatory variables of interest in Table 2 , Panel C, is DISPERSION, defined as the standard deviation of analyst EPS estimates, and it proxies for earnings uncertainty within a firm's information environment. Cheong and Thomas (2011) show that analyst EPS forecast dispersion does not vary with scale, so we do not scale DISPERSION in our main tests. As a robustness check, we define dispersion alternatively as the standard deviation of analysts' EPS estimates, scaled by the company's stock price on the date of the conference call (DISPERSIONSC). To avoid a small denominator problem, we require that the stock price be equal to or greater than $1.00. Results using this alternative definition (not tabulated) are similar to those presented in Table 2 , Panel C, with the exception that the estimated coefficient for DISPERSIONSC is insignificant in Column (2).
In Table 4 , Panels B and C, our explanatory variable of interest is NUMBUYSIDERS, which measures the level of buy-side analyst participation on companies' conference calls.
Alternatively, we can define the absolute change in buy-side analyst participation (ABSCNUMBUYSIDERS) to explain absolute changes in company-level stock prices, trading volume, total institutional ownership, and short interest. Results using this alternative specification (not tabulated) are similar to those presented in Table 4 , Panels B and C.
Limiting sample of companies to those with sell-side analyst coverage of ten or fewer
The results in Table 2 , Panels B and C, indicate that buy-side analysts are more likely to participate in a company's earnings conference call when there are fewer sell-side analysts that cover the company. However, for companies that are covered by a large number of sell-side analysts, there may be no opportunity for buy-side analysts to ask questions if sell-side analysts get priority to ask a question and there is a time constraint on the conference call. Therefore, to check the robustness of our results, we repeat our analysis using a subsample of firms that are covered by ten (the third quartile value) or fewer sell-side analysts. This restriction eliminates 14,412 conference calls from 1,144 firms (out of 3,414) from our analysis. The results (not tabulated) of estimating regression equation (1) using this subsample remain similar to those presented in Table 2 , Panel C despite the loss of statistical power. For example, the coefficient for NUMSSANALYSTS in Column (1) is −0.056 with a Z-stat of −6.46, compared to the coefficient of −0.064 with a Z-stat of −12.25 shown in Table 2 , Panel C. Therefore, we do not believe that time constraints on conference calls drive our main results.
Limiting conference calls to those near the beginning of a calendar quarter
The results in Table 3 , Panel A, indicate that institutional investment firms are more likely to change their level of shareholdings, and to a greater degree, after their buy-side analysts participate on a company's conference call. One caveat to this analysis is that since the Thomson
Reuters database of 13F filings shows quarterly shareholdings, we cannot identify whether changes in shareholdings occur before or after (or both) the company's conference call. As a robustness check, we repeat this analysis (not tabulated) using a reduced sample in which the dates of companies' conference calls are close to the beginning of the calendar quarter, which increases the likelihood that quarterly changes in ownership occur after the conference call. For conference calls that are within three weeks of the beginning of the calendar quarter, the sample size is reduced by 83% (from 17,691 to 2,961 buy-side analysts in a conference call), yet we still find results very similar to those presented in Table 3 Panel A. For example, among owning institutions with buy-side analyst participation, 46% increased their ownership, 51% decreased their ownership, and 4% did not change their ownership. Among non-owning institutions without buy-side analyst participation, 7% established new ownership in the company and 93% did not.
Results for institutions without buy-side analyst participation are also similar to those presented in Panel A.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine a large sample of buy-side analysts who participated on companies' earnings conference calls to better understand the process in which buy-side analysts gather information. Contrary to the common perception that earnings conference calls are venues for sell-side analysts and company managers to interact, we find evidence consistent with the notion that buy-side analysts participate in such calls when a company's information environment is poor. We also document that institutional investors tend to increase or decrease their ownership in the stock to a greater degree after the conference call when their buy-side analysts participate on the call. This result suggests that buy-side analysts use information gathered from conference calls to revise or update their stock recommendations, which ultimately leads to their institution trading the stock after the conference call. Finally, we find associations between buy-side analyst participation on conference calls and companies' future absolute stock returns, share turnover, changes in total institutional ownership and short interest, which we interpret as evidence that the buy-side analysts we observe on conference calls and the subsequent trading decisions by their employing institutions are reflective of other buy-side analysts and institutions that we do not observe. Overall, our study contributes to the literature on buy-side analysts by highlighting earnings conference calls as one of their important research activities, and by also highlighting the implications of their participation for the institutional investment firms that employ them and for the companies that host the conference calls. Thomson Reuters Streetevents NUMFIRMSINPORT Log of the number of companies in an institutional investment firm's portfolio, measured as of the calendar quarter ended prior to the conference call.
Thomson Reuters 13F database NUMSSANALYSTS Number of sell-side analysts that issued any type of EPS forecast for a company during the period from the prior conference call to one day before the current conference call.
I/B/E/S DISPERSION Standard deviation of sell-side analysts' current quarter EPS forecasts published in the period from the prior conference call to the current conference call.
I/B/E/S NC_ANALYSTS Number of non-covering analysts who participated on the conference call, scaled by the total number of sell-side analysts on the conference call.
Thomson Reuters Streetevents and I/B/E/S COV_ANALYSTS_ABSENT Number of covering sell-side analysts that participated on the prior conference call but did not participate on the current conference call, scaled by the total number of sell-side analysts on the conference call. Pseudo R 2 0.024 0.030 0.026 Z-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by companies *, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. Table 2 presents results related to testing the determinants of buy-side analyst participation on earnings confere calls. Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in an ordered logistic regression. Panel B shows t for differences in mean and median values of the variables for companies with buy-side analysts on their confere calls and companies without buy-side analysts on their conference calls. Panel C shows the results of ord logistics regressions with three ordinal levels (0, 1, and 2 or more) on the dependent variable. All vari definitions are included in Appendix 2. 0.306 *, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test Standard errors are clustered by institutional investment firm. Table 3 presents results related to examining institutional trading after buy-side analyst participation on compan earnings conference calls. Panel A presents changes in institutional ownership conditional on buy-side ana participation. Panel B shows the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the absolute chang percentage ownership that institution j has in company i in quarter t on an indicator vari (PARTICIPATEINCALL i,j,t ) for whether a buy-side analyst employed by institution j participated on compan conference call in quarter t. All variable definitions are included in Appendix 2. 0.137 Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
